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The reinvention of elite accumulation in the Angolan oil sector: Emergent 
capitalism in a rentier economy1
The post-war transition in Angola has involved small shifts in strategies of elite ac-
cumulation to maintain the status quo and deepen the internal concentration of power 
and wealth. This paper hypothesizes that Angola is at the beginning of a fundamen-
tal political-economic shift – away from the peripheral rentier economy and towards an 
indigenous system of capitalist accumulation. Recent developments in the oil and oil 
services sectors such as the push for increased local content, or “ngolanisation , show 
that the elite is engaged in a process of reinventing itself. Unfortunately, the tendency 
of the transition is towards the further entrenchment of the power of the Angolan elite 
and increasingly unequal distribution of wealth under the emerging social relations of 
production and accumulation.
Keywords: petroleum, development, capitalist accumulation, local content, 
Sonangol, Angola
A reinvenção da acumulação das elites no sector petrolífero de Angola: O 
capitalismo emergente numa economia rentista 
A transição pós-guerra em Angola envolveu pequenas mudanças nas estratégias de 
acumulação da elite para manter o status quo e aprofundar a concentração interna de 
poder e riqueza. Este artigo coloca a hipótese de que Angola está no início de uma mu-
dança político-económica fundamental – da economia rentista periférica para um sistema 
indígena de acumulação capitalista. Desenvolvimentos recentes no sector petrolífero e no 
sector da prestação de serviços como a pressão para aumentar o conteúdo local angola-
nização , mostram que a elite está envolvida num processo de reinvenção de si própria. 
Infelizmente, a tendência da transição é para um maior entrincheiramento do poder da 
elite angolana e uma crescente desigualdade na distribuição de riqueza sob as relações 
sociais emergentes de produção e acumulação.
Palavras-chave  petróleo, desenvolvimento, acumulação capitalista, conteúdo 
local, Sonangol, Angola
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By almost any measure, Angola is a country undergoing profound change. 
Today, the juxtaposition of old and new overwhelms visitors to the capital 
of Luanda, where construction cranes dominate the ever-changing skyline. 
Advertisements for the Banco de Fomento de Angola (BFA)2, one of the largest banks 
in Angola, show male and female celebrities perched on an iron girder dangling 
from a crane high above the city, exhorting passers-by to “Grow with Angola”. 
One of the few constants throughout Angola’s many post-independence up-
heavals has been the presence of the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola (MPLA), which has been under the leadership of President José Eduardo 
dos Santos since 1979. In fact, the MPLA and its leader have emerged from each 
successive period of change with a stronger hold on power than before. The struc-
ture of Angola’s economy, which is heavily dependent on rents from petroleum, 
has sustained the system of presidential patronage that has allowed the party 
and its president to survive. For that reason, despite the double-digit growth of 
the past decade interrupted only briely by the global inancial crisis , the struc-
ture of the economy has also remained a constant, to the detriment of the average 
citizen.
To use the terminology of Samir Amin (1974, 1976) Angola’s economy is only 
peripherally connected to the global capitalist system. While it imports goods 
and exports resources, its economy is predominantly non-capitalist in that there 
has not been widespread proletarianisation. In recent decades, Angola has tran-
sitioned from a centrally-planned one-party state to a (nominally) multiparty 
(quasi) market economy. Steve Kibble (2006) writes that the “politics of disor-
der” predominated in post-war Angola and suited the Angolan elite as they 
proclaimed transition for “outside cosmetic purposes” (p. 525). In fact, the near-
universal view in the academy, and, at least privately, amongst other Angola-
watchers, is that litle has changed in the political economy of “ngola since 
Christine Messiant described it in 1992 as a system of “clientelist redistribution” 
(Messiant, 1992 cited in Hodges, 2004). However, a careful reading of Angola’s 
various transitions shows that each has involved small shifts in strategies of elite 
accumulation in order to maintain the status quo, or indeed, to deepen the inter-
nal concentration of power and wealth. 
This paper hypothesizes that Angola may be at the beginning of a more fun-
damental shift in its political economy; away from the peripheral rentier econ-
omy that has developed since independence and towards an indigenous system 
of capitalist accumulation. The paper does not explore the Angolan economy as 
2 BFA is 100% owned by ”anco Português de Investimento (BPI). The daughter of the President, Isabel dos Santos, is 
a signiicant shareholder in ”PI.
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a whole. Rather, by focusing on recent developments in the oil and oil services 
sectors, it is argued that the beginnings of a shift from rentierism and more primi-
tive methods of accumulation in the oil industry can now be discerned from an 
analysis of strategies of elite accumulation. Furthermore, the possibility is very 
real that this transformation will continue to grow in strength over time given 
policies of “local content”, or “Angolanisation”. Far from heralding the glorious 
coming of development under capitalism, the tendency of the transition as it is 
currently envisioned is towards continued underdevelopment and accumulation 
by dispossession fuelled by the further entrenchment of the power of the Angolan 
elite and increasingly unequal distribution of wealth under the emerging social 
relations of production and accumulation.
Elite accumulation in Angola: a historical approach
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the ruling MPLA underwent a transition culmin-
ating in  with the decision by the Central Commitee to end the one-party 
system and to formally abandon Marxism-Leninism and embrace economic lib-
eralisation. Ferreira (1995) argues that Angola’s petroleum nomenklatura was not 
quick to embrace such fundamental change. Rather, the politics of rentierism and 
the elite’s ability to pillage the state allowed them to resist change until it became 
inevitable.
For Ferreira, these events ushered in a period of transition from 1991-92 dur-
ing which the nomenklatura adapted to the market economy and economic lib-
eralisation. By 1993-1994, this “reconversion” was complete and the nomenklatura 
had successfully adapted without signiicantly altering their source of wealth, 
which remained petroleum rents. This was done through a shift in accumulation 
strategies to embrace privatisation. Ferreira concludes:
The economic reconversion of the nomenklatura is today almost complete : on the 
ideological and political front, the acceptance of the functioning of a democracy 
(with limitations) proved not incompatible with the maintenance of its social and 
economic status. Authoritarianism was not the only possible guarantee of their 
privileged situation; a market economy proved similarly compatible with the pres-
ervation of their privileges (p. 18, author’s translation).
In what has become perhaps the deinitive statement on the political economy 
of Angola into the post-war transition, Hodges (2004) describes a system where 
The rent from oil is used primarily to satisfy elite interests and inance means of 
retaining power, through expenditure of security and patronage, rather than to 
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promote social and economic development” (p. 203). In this system, patronage 
lows directly from the top – the Oice of the President. President dos Santos 
uses all the powers of his oice to reward loyalty in symbiotic patron-client re-
lationships that are highly toxic to the country. The result, described by Kibble 
(2006), is a state where few citizens have access to clean water, health, education, 
public order, justice, energy, and infrastructure.
There is surprising uniformity in the picture painted of the Angolan elite. 
Hodges (2004) argues that corruption is “endemic throughout the public admin-
istration”, and even takes on some of the language of Marxist political economy 
when he says that corruption at higher levels is “part of the process of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ by the politically connected elites” (p. 83). In their 2005 Drivers 
of Change report, Vines, Shaxson and Rimli (2005) write: “Angola’s economy is 
strongly controlled by a presidency that wields power through personalised net-
works which, as in many African and other countries, can be more important 
than the ministries and other formal institutions” (p. 7).
Hodges (2004) describes several strategies of direct and indirect elite accumu-
lation used in Angola in the post-Marxist-Leninist period. Indirect appropriation 
occurs through manipulation of exchange rate policy, interest rates and access 
to credit. For example, until 1999, the government used privileged access to the 
administratively-set oicial exchange rate to enrich the elite and transfer state 
resources to individual beneiciaries. More direct methods of elite accumulation 
described by Hodges include privatisation and land reform, as well as base loot-
ing of state cofers. Much of this privatisation occurred without proper valua-
tions of the assets or competitive bidding3. Meanwhile, as Hodges notes, many 
army oicers and state oicials acquired farms and other businesses as political 
favours, often for nominal sums or no payment at all, under a large land priva-
tisation programme that began in the early 1990s. 
Finally, Hodges (2004) notes that, over time, restrictions on competition, and 
the Angolanisation of the economy have become increasingly important strat-
egies of elite accumulation. At the same time, the elite’s incorporation into do-
mestic and international circuits of capital has become increasingly important 
to their enrichment – particularly as aforementioned strategies, such as the ex-
change rate policy and allocation of credit, waned. Central to the new strategy is 
the climate of oligopolistic or monopolistic market conditions created by import 
procedures, other forms of administrative favouritism, and harassment of busi-
nesses by the Polícia Económica.
3 Privatization during the 1991-1992 period of transition is discussed in greater detail by Ferreira (1995).
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Sonangol’s role as a vehicle for presidential patronage, particularly in terms 
of access to business opportunities, is mentioned by many authors, most notably 
Soares de Oliveira (2007a), who writes: 
In short, the Sonangol Group has been not only the manager of the Futungo’s phan-
tom revenue lows, but also the enabler of elite rentierism across important non-oil 
dimensions of the domestic economy, simultaneously guaranteeing that all prof-
itable business opportunities are arbitrated by state rulers via the company (pp. 
608-609).
In , Hodges conirmed that increasingly the elite are relying on their pre-
viously accumulated wealth and preferential access to the state to the extent that 
the patronage system has moved into a phase where some wealthy Angolans 
who beneited from earlier phases of accumulation and privatisation  can now 
take advantage of their ties to the presidency to beneit from the government’s 
policy of Angolanisation, whereby they can participate directly in the oil indus-
try through the establishment of service companies. Sonangol, in turn, pressures 
oil operators to contract to these companies. At the same time, he writes that 
kick-backs on government contracts and the straight diversion of state resour-
ces to private individuals and companies continue to be important mechanisms 
of surplus appropriation, made possible by the general opaqueness of public i-
nances and the secrecy of oil-guaranteed loans. Taken together, it is clear that 
the literature on Angola does reveal several periods of political-economic change 
and a process of increasing complexity in strategies of elite accumulation.
Towards the reinvention of the Angolan elite
Beginning with the work of Ferreira, scholarship on the accumulation strat-
egies of the Angolan elite shows a remarkable capacity on behalf of the elite to 
adapt and reinvent themselves as necessary to suit changed geopolitical realities. 
Today, as the elite reinvent themselves, there is reason to question whether even 
the opaqueness of public inance, the ”ermuda Triangle  described by Hodges 
and Kibble, and the notorious oil-backed loans, will remain important constructs 
for the Angolan elite, who may see greater value in increased international legit-
imacy4. At the same time, as Angola becomes more important economically and 
4 Like an iceberg, what is known of Angola’s sordid history of state-led appropriation of economic surplus is 
only the surface. Meaningful eforts to reveal this history include Global Witness . “lthough such eforts 
continue (see Global Witness, 2011), the damage done to Angola’s reputation seems to be far less severe.
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strategically to the West and to China, there may be greater desire to grant that 
legitimacy despite lingering remnants of the unsavoury past5.
Olivier Vallée  conirms that recent years have seen more technocratic 
management of petroleum rent in conjunction with inance capitalism, which he 
describes as part of the “adaptive spirit of Angolan capitalism” (p. 21). Concluding 
that the rentiers in power have not been content to ight for oil money  to cap-
ture it and transfer it out of the country”, Vallée writes that there has been a “hy-
bridisation of capital” produced from an “accommodation” of “Afro-Marxism 
with a disembodied liberal discourse” (pp. 39-46, author’s translation). This is the 
seting for a new reinvention of the “ngolan elite as capitalist entrepreneurs.
Speaking about the possibility of primitive accumulation leading to capital-
ism and the makings of an haute bourgeoisie, Soares de Oliveira (2007b) writes: 
Reality could not possibly be more diferent . He goes on to say deinitively  
“Elites are focused on ‘rent seeking, not economic activity’” (p. 140, citing Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). However, this analysis is premised on the assumption that 
other sources of income “cannot compete with oil rents” (p. 141). It is precisely on 
this point that the antinomies of the hypothesized transition will play out. Much 
will depend on just how altered the political economic context is, not just with 
the end of the war in , but with a completely diferent geopolitical moment 
in the Gulf of Guinea as a whole. Soares de Oliveira writes that “the elite is not 
a ‘class’ with a constant notion of where ‘its’ interest lies…” (p. 133). However, 
history has shown a powerful tendency for the elites to gain consciousness (as 
a class) that capitalist accumulation is preferable to dependence on political pa-
tronage and to make a capitalist transition when they are able to do so, and in 
particular, when it becomes possible to proit more from capitalist accumulation 
than from rent-seeking activities.
In The Emergence of African Capitalism, historian John Ilife  presents three 
types of regimes that emerged in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa: “anticapital-
ist , parasitic capitalist , and nurture capitalist . The inal category, nurture 
capitalism, refers to a deliberate atempt by the state to create an economy in 
which at least substantial areas of enterprise would be in the hands of private 
capitalists . Following Ilife, Catherine ”oone  asks  Will “frica’s polit-
ical classes use their power to expand the scope of local capital accumulation, 
especially by supporting and facilitating local private investment in industry?” 
5 Some recent developments in the Angolan drive to gain international legitimacy include the country obtaining 
an average ”+ sovereign rating with positive outlook from three rating classiication agencies in May  which 
removes the need to seek oil-backed loans), the negotiation of a stand-by arrangement with the IMF in November 
2009, worth an estimated US$1.4bn, moves to publish more data related to the economy and the oil sector (despite 
all the limitations described by Global Witness, 2011), and the passage of the Law on Public Probity in 2010 
despite its many laws .
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Exploring the case of Senegal, Boone suggests that, in light of evidence she col-
lected that in certain cases the political class is willing and able to use state power 
to promote local capital accumulation and local investment in industry, “argu-
ments to the efect that these social strata are invariably comprador in character 
can no longer be accepted” (p. 185). 
Noting that her scenario is contingent on “the emergence of a class or part of a 
class commited to a bourgeois project, the consolidation and efective exercise of 
its political power, and the existence of a state with the institutional and political 
capacities needed to promote efectively the interests of nascent indigenous cap-
italist strata , ”oone writes that in most of “frica, no signiicant stratum or frac-
tion of the wealth-accumulating political class invests in productive activities… 
in these situations, political classes are predominantly ‘rentier’ in nature”. She 
explains that while indigenising capital accumulation is in the interest of “some” 
political classes, the political project of consolidating internal political dominance 
and retaining control over the state apparatus is central in all cases (Boone, 1998, 
p. . ”oone’s argument suggests that to ind a regime that nurtures capitalist 
development, there would need to be a consolidated political class and a strong 
incentive to promote productive activity.
Of course, patronage can still play an important role in this type of capitalist 
transformation. In ”oone’s work, clientelism is identiied as an important fea-
ture of rentierism, which is contrasted with indigenising capital accumulation. 
In the case of Angola, rentierism and the indigenisation of capital accumulation 
go hand-in-hand, since Angolanisation is, as Hodges notes, an increasingly im-
portant mechanism of elite accumulation. To be sure, the indigenous oil services 
sector, which is the focus of this study, is not yet signiicant in terms of import-
ance to the Angolan economy, nor to the investment strategies of most elites. 
However, if local capitalism is to emerge in Angola, there are several reasons that 
it is more likely to do so in oil services irst. 
What follows is a study of the potential of the oil services sector in Angola to 
transform from rentierism to local capitalism. It must be left for a later project 
to extend that analysis to the rest of the Angolan economy. One of the key rea-
sons to look irst at the oil services sector is that local content in the oil and gas 
industry is one of the only mechanisms of economic protection with acceptance 
and legitimacy in the eyes of international capital. Additionally, the oil sector has 
the potential for many more backward and forward linkages than is commonly 
understood. These include opportunities to provide business services, rent com-
mon and specialized equipment, and produce a wide variety of materials, chem-
icals, and parts. In many cases, these new business opportunities have the poten-
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tial to bridge the oil and the non-oil economies and involve more Angolans in 
capitalist production. This potential is much less present in construction, a sector 
where it is much more di cult to encourage or protect indigenous companies, let 
alone diamond extraction, which ofers far fewer links to the rest of the economy. 
Finally, local content can be an internationally acceptable way to promote other 
sectors of the economy such as telecommunications or banking, as seen in with 
the November 2011 passage of a law to require international oil companies to use 
the Angolan banking system to pay Angolan taxes and overseas contractors. 
In theorising an Angolan transition to capitalism, this paper takes the Marxian 
notion of capitalism as the way in which society organises economic and social 
production and reproduction. If the Angolan elite are shifting slowly to embrace 
a capitalist social structure and the capitalist mode of production, this would 
represent a transformation not only in strategies of elite accumulation, but in the 
elite themselves  from a rentier elite to what Janet MacGafey  has called 
“real capitalists” or what may also be thought of us a real indigenous bourgeoi-
sie (cited in Leys, 1994, p. 25). Of course, it may be a very long time before social 
relations in Angola are predominantly or even primarily capitalistic in nature. 
This also depends on the extent to which the transformations in the oil sector 
described below are also occurring in the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, 
given the importance of the oil sector to the Angolan economy, the important 
point is whether or not a signiicant shift may be occurring or about to occur in 
that sector.
Local/national content in Angola’s oil industry
Before examining the altered political economic context, it is necessary to re-
view the basics of local content6 in “ngola’s oil industry. Local content is signii-
cant because it provides a legal basis for facilitating the entry of Angolan com-
panies into the oil industry. In Angola, local content has developed along two 
separate paths. Angolanisation, which refers primarily to promoting the employ-
ment of Angolans in the oil sector, dates back to legislation from the early 1980s7. 
Today, while the law has been rewriten, “ngolanisation remains a project of 
the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of Petroleum. Meanwhile, en-
couraging local content in terms of procurement of Angolan goods and services 
6 In Angola, the terms “local content”, “national content”, and “Angolanisation” are used interchangeably, 
though the change in terminology from the former to the later has served the political purposes of the “ngolan 
state.
7 For more background on the history of the Angolan oil industry with reference to local content policy, see 
Ovadia (2012a). A useful comparison with Nigeria can be found in Ovadia (2012b). 
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is primarily the responsibility of Sonangol, which exercises a great deal of control 
over who is awarded contracts from the operating companies. Since 2003, there 
has been legislation to promote Angolan companies, to reserve some categories 
of oil services for these companies, and to require foreign companies to work in 
joint ventures with Angolans in most other categories of services.
While there is a long list of relevant legislation relating to local content, the 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs), negotiated by Sonangol through the 
Negotiations Directorate (D.NEG) are more important. Since 2008, D.NEG has also 
had responsibility for national content development, which has been taken up 
by the Department of Enterprise Development and Promotion (D.NEG/DFE). One 
of the key Sonangol managers in this department summarised some of what is 
being planned for a new national content strategy:
The best way to develop national content in a country like Angola, or even Nigeria, 
is by project. You must try and optimize the beneit by project and by the PSA, 
not by a legal framework covering everything… Legislation doesn’t optimize local 
content; it just grants it. It can’t enforce, just demand8.
The manager made clear that modiications to the provisions of the PSA in 
future bid rounds, along with amendments to existing PSAs, would be the pri-
mary method of implementing the new national content strategy. This statement 
explains why the D.NEG has been the division within Sonangol that has taken 
over responsibility for local content. However, both the Sonangol manager and 
an oicial within the Ministry of Petroleum with responsibility for local content 
conirmed that there will likely be new laws consolidating and regulating na-
tional content9. 
Previous local content eforts have focused on encouraging participation of 
Angolans in the exploration and production of petroleum; however, these have 
largely failed due to the complexity and capital-intense nature of this industry. 
Current eforts are more targeted at the oil services sector. “ccording to data from 
the Ministry of Petroleum, investment in the Angolan oil sector reached almost 
US$16.5 billion in 2009 (Ministério dos Petróleos [MINPET], 2010). Capturing more 
of the capital invested in the sector will lead to signiicant economic growth and 
development, particularly if this investment encourages the oil and oil services 
sectors to serve as an anchor for growth and development of economic activity in 
related sectors, such as manufacturing and services. It could also create signii-
cant employment, a phenomenon not generally associated with petroleum.
8 Interview, August 2010.
9 Interview, August 2010.
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The oil services sector is all but ignored by most economic analyses. For ex-
ample, in Vines, Shaxson and Rimli (2005), the economy is analysed in three 
parts: “the non-oil, non-diamond economy”; “the oil sector”; and “the diamond 
sector”. In the section on the oil economy, there is no mention of oil services. 
Similarly, in a 2011 United Nations report on industrial development in Africa 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2011), there 
was no mention of the potential for development through oil services (which 
includes manufacturing and heavy industry). Even a recent IMF study on “The 
Linkage between the Oil and the Non-oil Sectors” (Klein, 2010), failed to mention 
oil services. 
Local content has been a focus of economic policy throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa, given the successes of Norway, Brazil and Malaysia. While increased lo-
cal content seems likely to spur economic development, it is not often analysed 
in terms of social or political development. Given the context of “ngola, local/
national content seems equally likely to reinforce the power and wealth of the 
elite of the MPLA and the high-ups in Sonangol. This concern makes it all the more 
pressing to question what kind of society this transformation might create given 
the dynamics of power in Angola. However, before such questions can be asked, 
the evidence of the transformation must be evaluated.
Quantitative evidence of a growing Angolan economy
The primary evidence used to determine economic growth is data related 
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As mentioned above, GDP growth was boom-
ing until the inancial crisis hit in . In , The Economist published data 
showing that Angola had the world’s highest GDP growth rate in the past decade. 
Although this statistic (and GDP growth rates in general) become less impressive 
when one examines where Angola was a decade ago, the trend is still important 
in creating conditions under which a transition could take place. Despite some 
diferences, key estimates and projections for GDP growth in Angola show a re-
turn to healthy economic growth, if not the spectacular expansion of 2005-2007. 
Table 1 
Real GDP growth Per cent
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
11.2 20.6 18.6 21.1 13.4
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2010
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More telling perhaps is data obtained from the Angolan Agency for Private 
Investment (ANIP), which shows steady increases in new private investment by 
“ngolans and foreigners from - . The data is suicient to show large in-
creases in both domestic and foreign private investment over the past ive years 
(once adjusted for a large spike in construction and in transportation, storage and 
communication in 2005 – see Table 3)10. 
Table 2 
Private investment: “ngolan vs. foreign




$738,771,000 $332,787,000 $447,303,000 $417,079,000 $679,404,000
Foreign private 
investment
$2,475,255,000 $498,802,000 $882,236,000 $803,510,000 $1,162,668,000
TOTAL $3,214,026,000 $831,589,000 $1,329,539,000 $1,220,589,000 $1,842,072,000
Source: Angolan Agency for Private Investment (ANIP)
Table 3 
Private investment in Angola by sector
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agriculture, forestry  
and isheries
$18,805,000 $30,665,000 $57,223,000 $28,116,000 $375,711,000
Real estate and business 
services
$41,819,000 $42,703,000 $61,987,000 $97,064,000 $146,890,000
Construction $2,225,500,000 $255,527,000 $207,008,000 $261,026,000 $345,355,000
Education, health, social 
services and other
$4,023,000 $24,554,000 $44,817,000 $10,490,000 $16,697,000
Extractive industry $64,961,000 $85,772,000 $11,289,000 $32,918,000 $22,527,000
Hotels and restaurants $5,370,000 $100,701,000 $21,213,000 $26,796,000 $14,191,000
Manufacturing $156,298,000 $185,858,000 $734,497,000 $675,115,000 $838,885,000
Electricity, gas and water $292,000 $0 $120,200,000 $0 $2,916,000
Retail $49,240,000 $35,554,000 $42,343,000 $43,924,000 $54,555,000
Transportation, storage 
and communication
$647,718,000 $70,255,000 $28,962,000 $45,140,000 $24,345,000
TOTAL $3,214,026,000 $831,589,000 $1,329,539,000 $1,220,589,000 $1,842,072,000
Source: ANIP
10 Although not covered by the data, it was reported in June 2011 that private investment through ANIP grew 
again in 2010 – see AngolaPress (2011).
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The data excludes most oil investment, since this investment is made under 
the terms of the PSAs and also excludes all public investment (including private 
investment from China under the loan arrangements with China Exim Bank). 
Some new investment in the oil services sector is captured in the data, although 
a large portion of this investment also occurs through the PSAs. In the raw data 
provided by ANIP, some investment in the category of Business Services is spe-
ciically tagged as being related to the oil industry. This data is captured in Table 
. The igures represent only a small portion of new investment in oil services  
however they do show a signiicant increase in both foreign and domestic invest-
ment.
Table 4 
Private investment in business services to the oil services sector
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Angolan private 
investment
$111,000 $100,000 $2,650,000 $2,951,000 $4,300,000
Foreign private 
investment
$13,392,000 $4,566,000 $6,338,000 $15,489,000 $18,078,000
TOTAL $13,503,000 $4,666,000 $8,988,000 $18,440,000 $22,378,000
Source: ANIP
Although most foreign companies operating in Angola must register with 
ANIP (exceptions include companies selling goods and services to the military, 
companies operating under the China Exim Bank loan, and companies oper-
ating in Angola under a PSA), Angolan companies are not required to register 
with ANIP, unless they are investing with capital that is domiciled abroad. Most 
Angolans do register with ANIP regardless in order to qualify for a variety of 
government incentives.
Local content and elite accumulation in Angola: 
a qualitative approach
Taken together, the data shows strong growth in the economy and in invest-
ment by both Angolans and foreign investors. However, in the context of Angola, 
quantitative evidence is only useful to complement what must be shown qualita-
tively. Therefore, I conducted a series of interviews in Angola with key inform-
ants from civil society, government, and the oil industry11. Through interviews 
11 The research was conducted from May to September of  as part of my dissertation ieldwork. “ total of ifty-
nine (59) separate open-ended interviews were conducted with sixty-four (64) interview subjects, both Angolans 
and foreigners. With the exception of one interview conducted by phone with a subject living in Europe, all 
interviews took place in person in either Luanda or Cabinda. Relecting the skew in “ngolan society and par-
ticularly in the industry, . % of the interviewees were male. Key informants were identiied using a snowball  
methodology.
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and case studies, I intend to show a dynamic and increasingly favourable land-
scape for the development of capitalist social relations centred in the oil indus-
try. 
The nature of doing business in “ngola makes inding “ngolan business 
people extremely di cult. It was therefore well into the second month of re-
search before I was able to break through and arrange series of interviews with 
Angolan businessmen in the oil and oil services sector12. In my irst interview, the 
owner of an Angolan oil services company told me: 
In most countries you see that people that have their own companies, their own 
businesses, don’t mind saying what they have, how many companies they have—
if they have a company, how many workers they have, how much they sell, how 
much they do. Here in Angola you don’t see anyone telling you that they have a 
group of companies – how many workers they have, how much taxes they pay. 
Nobody will tell you that. People tend to do everything very secretly13. 
Since 1990, a particular group of Angolans – generally those with a background 
in Sonangol – have started up oil exploration and production companies as well 
as companies providing services to the international oil companies operating in 
“ngola. However, as one such businessman conided to me, “ngolan business-
men generally make their money of of trading/export-import businesses and 
also domestic trading (i.e. buying in Luanda, selling to the provinces). 
Based on his own ethnographic research into the business climate in Angola, 
Mez  refers to two separate spaces in “ngola’s market economy  the priv-
ileged market economy  for elite and state-owned irms  and restrained mar-
ket economy” (for small, medium and micro enterprises). Given this dynamic, it 
is not surprising that in 2008 the World Bank ranked Angola 168th in the world in 
terms of ease of doing business. 
According to an economic reporter for one of Angola’s independent news-
papers, “In Angola, corruption functions by the connection between politics and 
business”14. The irst “ngolan businessman I interviewed described a particu-
larly inhospitable climate for Angolan entrepreneurs in which to supply to the 
government one must currently be in the government. It is a climate in which it 
12 My position as a white male, foreigner and non-native speaker of Portuguese was both positive and negative 
for the research. No doubt it had a signiicant impact on who I was able to speak to and what they said. Therefore, 
the results relect a particular standpoint and are framed by the theoretical lens through which I understand 
them. My standpoint is articulated not to invalidate the evidence, since all qualitative and quantitative data are 
collected by some person or group with a particular subjective position. Rather, it is to help the reader interpret 
the evidence and evaluate its explanatory power.
13 Interview, July 2010.
14 Interview, July 2010.
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is impossible to compete fairly and in which there is litle freedom to enter the 
market without the right connections. 
This particular businessman also made a comparison I heard more than once 
during my interviews:
To understand capitalist development in Angola today, you have to see how 
Europe was two centuries ago… The big families control everything. In Portugal 
until 1975 that was the case. Few people could really enter into big businesses. 
Angola is still doing that. It is still trying to create an aristocracy... to have only a 
few big families, a few big businesses that can support the economy15.
Obviously, the validity of comparing emerging capitalism in Angola to its 
emergence in Europe is of limited value given the vast diferences in historical 
context. However, this comparison does show that the emergence of capitalism, 
far from the rosy picture painted by some enthusiasts, is a messy process. The 
above-mentioned member of the elite put it well when he admited  We are the 
sons of rich fathers. We are behaving terribly – like spoiled kids”16. 
Paul Kennedy writes: “In a capitalist economy, it might be highly desirable, 
indeed essential, for long-term national economic development if there was a 
steady build-up of resources in certain families which did not come to a halt 
within each generation” (1988, p. 175). While one cannot look at the unregulated 
nature of economic activity in Angola and compare it to Great Britain during the 
industrial revolution, what must be established is whether or not Angolans are 
beginning to take capital, invest it in factors of production, and produce outputs 
of higher value that allow them to make proit.
Addressing the debate over the possible emergence of African capitalism, 
Kennedy argues:
the belief that there is a fundamental contradiction between continued incorpora-
tion of Third World countries into world capitalism and the possibility of indus-
trialization no longer seems as valid as it once did. Thus, some recent writers have 
argued that metropolitan interests are no longer opposed to development in the 
periphery and participation in the world capitalist order is not only compatible 
with industrial transformation but is one of its prerequisites (1988, p. 106, citing 
Beckman, 1981).
To establish whether or not there is movement towards capitalist production, 
it is necessary to determine whether there is any sign that wealthy Angolans 
15 Interview, July 2010.
16 Ibid.
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are investing more of their money (whether or not it was illicitly accumulated) 
into the country. It is not necessary to assume that the elite would be doing this 
because they are no longer solely interested in their own reproduction but in the 
development of the Angolan economy. To the contrary, the point of this essay is 
to show how new conjunctural forces bring the goals of the elite more in line with 
the promotion of nurture capitalism.
The quantitative data above from ANIP hints at such movement, but cannot 
present a satisfying case on its own. Soares de Oliveria (2007b) has clearly docu-
mented a tendency for the elite to move rents from oil abroad, as have many 
other authors. However, one prominent Angolan economist responded: “I am 
convinced this will change in ten years. Angolans will become more interested in 
investing in our economy rather than investing abroad… We do already have rich 
people who put their money in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing”17.
“ move by the “ngolan elite to invest more at home was also conirmed by 
other Angolans in the oil sector. When asked if there has been more investment by 
Angolans in the Angolan economy, Carlos Amaral, one of the most well-known 
Angolans in the oil industry, said: 
I believe yes. After the 2002 stabilisation, you can see many more Angolans partici-
pating directly in the economy… I wouldn’t be able to tell you the numbers, but 
when I go around Angola, and I travel a lot, there is a lot more entrepreneurship 
going on18. 
This statement is generally representative of what most Angolans I spoke 
with observed.
Some of the sectors in which there has been local growth, according to Amaral, 
include insurance and banking. However, Amaral noted that some of this was by 
imposition and that this growth has occurred despite limitations in the way the 
system is set up to allow for such investment. Similar to other interviewees, and 
mirroring Mez’s description of the business climate in “ngola as savage cap-
italism”, Amaral described this emerging entrepreneurship as “a very wild kind 
of capitalism”, arguing “We need more rules, but these rules can’t be created on 
day zero. They have to be created and also implemented. They need to be known 
around the country – not just in Luanda”19.
Underscoring the idea that Angola has entered a new moment for both domes-
tic and foreign private investment, a European lawyer who represents some of the 
17 Interview, July 2010.
18 Interview, August 2010.
19 Ibid.
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most senior members of the president’s inner circle, including family members 
and members of the cabinet, conirmed that the view of investment in “ngola by 
both his European and Angolan clients is shifting: “It’s no longer a place where 
you go to get a fast buck out of the country. Now people go to Angola for the 
long-term”20. This statement demonstrates the same idea or impression that is 
communicated through the BFA advertisements described at the beginning of this 
paper  “ngola as a dynamic and atractive place for investors. 
High-level corruption as a feature 
of emerging capitalism in Angola
In recent years, blatant examples of oicial corruption at the highest levels 
of the Angolan government have been documented in the public sphere, expos-
ing the extent to which the “ngolan elite have abused their oicial positions for 
new business opportunities. As the anti-corruption crusader Rafael Marques de 
Morais a  puts it, “ngola’s top state oicials ignore the distinction between 
public and private property and turn themselves into the country’s top entrepre-
neurs”. In a separate article, Marques de Morais (2012b) describes exactly how 
this system works:
The President has established a special task force within the intelligence services, 
which selects, distributes and oversees business opportunities for certain political 
and social igures, reward loyalists, co-opt dissenters, enrich certain families, and 
ensure a vertical and tight control of the patronage system to maintain the status 
quo... Furthermore, most of the relevant foreign investments in the country are 
made through joint ventures with companies owned by the presidential family 
and the ruling elite, which helps to secure international support and complicity 
through corruption (pp. 6-7).
Marques has been at the forefront of exposing oicial corruption in “ngola 
through his website Maka Angola21. In the summer of 2010, he made an enor-
mous splash by revealing that General Kopelipa, Manuel Vicente (who was then 
the chief executive of Sonangol), and General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento 
were the owners of Nazaki Oil and Gáz, which had been awarded stakes in 
”locks /  and / , operated by the U.S. company Cobalt International Energy 
(Marques de Morais, 2010). Cobalt, backed by Goldman Sachs and a partner-
ship between the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holdings, was subsequently 
20 Interview, September 2010.
21 htp //makaangola.org/
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put under investigation in the U.S. by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which handles civil cases, and the Department of Justice, which handles criminal 
cases (Burgis, 2012). 
After initially refusing to comment, the Angolan government has since 
changed strategy with regard to the Cobalt case. Vicente, who is now a govern-
ment minister and has been reported to be the MPLA Vice-Presidential nominee, 
has admited co-ownership of Nazaki and claimed his business dealings to be 
entirely lawful. “s “na Silva  describes  With the conidence of a man 
above the law, Vicente suggested that if Cobalt’s dealings with him and his asso-
ciates were to create further problems, the company should abandon its interests 
in Angola”.
What Mez calls the privileged market economy  is a space in which the 
“ngolan elite engage in unfetered primitive accumulation. The move to disguise 
elite enrichment as adoption of the “free” market sends mixed signals about 
emergent capitalism in Angola. In the case of Nazaki Oil and Gáz, there is zero 
beneit to “ngolan participation beyond the beneit to the bank accounts of the 
company’s principle shareholders. Those shareholders are simply rent-seekers, 
not capitalists. No productive activity resulted from Angolan participation, nor 
were any Angolan jobs created. However, in the oil services sector, there are signs 
that local content can have a positive impact on the Angolan economy. 
Case studies of emergent capitalism 
in the Angolan oil industry
The most efective way to collect data on whether or not any kind of trans-
formation is occurring in strategies of elite accumulation, or to detect change or 
potential change in modes of production in Angola, is to paint a picture of the 
sector through case studies. Case selection was at least partially done on the basis 
of opportunities presented. Overall, the evidence of movement towards domes-
tic capitalist accumulation through the production of value through secondary 
economic activity in oil exploration and production (as opposed to accumula-
tion through rent-seeking), is mixed. As one informant warned, there is a world 
of diference between greater investment and greater productive  investment. 
Additionally, while the cases below show some level of dynamism and a clear 
desire to engage in capitalist accumulation, the process is still at a very early 
stage, with many companies expressing litle more than an intention to change 
their business model. At the same time, examples persist of companies set up by 
“ngolans with litle interest in moving beyond rent seeking behaviour.
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Table 5 
Case studies
Case Ownership Activities Description
1 Angolan-controlled but majority 
of shares are owned by various 
foreign investors
E&P Company active and currently producing  
a small quantity of oil
2 Angolan E&P Company active and currently producing  
a small quantity of oil
3 Angolan E&P Active, but with no current production
4 Angolan Services Active in a variety of services through 
diferent “ngolan companies with  
separate Angolan investors and foreign 
joint venture partners
5 Angolan Services Active in Oil & Gas (through foreign joint 
ventures), Real Estate, and Investments
6 Majority Angolan Services Joint venture with a foreign company. 
Active in procurement of goods and 
services to oil sector
7 Angolan Services Active in a variety of services through 
foreign joint ventures
8 Angolan Services Active in a variety of services through 
foreign joint ventures
Of the eight cases summarised in Table , the irst three are “ngolan oil ex-
ploration and production (E&P) companies22. There are few companies in the E&P 
business, and they are all quite small. Companies in E&P generally fall under one 
of two categories. On the one hand, some are looking to build their knowledge, 
experience and capacity to be able to undertake more activities themselves. Such 
companies are actively seeking to make a proit from working in the sector and 
operating small ventures – generally onshore or in shallow water since this is 
much less capital intensive. There are only one or two private domestic E&P com-
panies in Angola that would fall into this category. On the other hand, there are 
companies set up by powerful members of the elite without experience in the oil 
sector as opposed to the companies atempting to build capacity, which are set 
up by powerful members of the elite with a background in the sector). As in the 
case of Nazaki Oil and Gáz, these “ngolans are looking to proit from small hold-
ings in deep ofshore blocks operated by others that they have accessed through 
their political connections and hope to proit from the rents accruing. There are 
22 For reasons of conidentiality and to protect the interests and well-being of the informants that participated 
in my research given the climate of secrecy and unfreedom that pervades in Angola, individuals and company 
names are not identiied in the case studies, though they may be identiiable by people familiar with the indus-
try.
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over a dozen such companies in Angola, though many are now dormant. Most 
are very opaque. They are, as one informant quipped, litle more than bank ac-
counts. In truth, not only have these companies been unproductive, they have 
also largely been unproitable because the people running them lack apprecia-
tion of the complexity and volatility of the international oil industry. 
Given the lack of publicly available information, it was initially very di cult 
to learn anything about the ownership of these companies. However, by the end 
of my research I had gathered some information from sources about the owner-
ship of most of them. In most cases, though I could not get enough informa-
tion to verify or prove what one or two sources were telling me, I feel that that 
information I collected on ownership has ofered me a glimpse into ownership 
paterns and political connections in the “ngolan domestic oil and gas industry. 
Additionally, the case studies show that while there may be some potential for 
local content to promote greater national participation in the oil services sector, 
there has been very litle actual value production to date.
Some information has come into the public domain through courageous in-
vestigations that suggest that the owners were close associates of the president, 
current members of the civil or military arms of government, or current Sonangol 
oicials23. “s case studies, there is litle to say about the companies that are just 
bank accounts in the name of a general or cabinet member close to the president. 
For the Government of Angola, these local “front” companies can generate nega-
tive publicity and sometimes great embarrassment when their ownership is re-
vealed. Given their general lack of returns to their owners, it seems unlikely that 
such companies will persist. Additionally, the international oil industry is con-
cerned that such companies tend not to pay their share of costs or participate 
in block management meetings. Of greater importance to the international oil 
companies, association with illicit companies connected to current government 
oicials creates a risk of prosecution for violations of anti-corruption legislation 
in many Western countries.
Company 1 was set up by an Angolan engineer with a background in govern-
ment, Sonangol, and the IOCs24. Intending to become a successful entrepreneur 
and make proit out of oil operations in “ngola, he devotes himself to the busi-
ness full time. “cting as Chief Executive Oicer CEO), its founder nevertheless 
has a minority interest in the company. It is probably the only private Angolan 
E&P company that is serious about being successful from a business standpoint. 
23 See for example Marques de Morais (2010) or Global Witness (2009).
24 For the sake of readability, each legal entity described as a case study is referred to as a “Company” even when 
it represents a variety of formal conglomerates, informal groups of companies and other legal arrangements.
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Although the company and its CEO are well known, the company does not have 
a website nor has its contact information been made public.
The greatest di culty the company faces is access to capital. “ccording to the 
company’s CEO, “[My company] is not going well. We are up to our necks. Oil 
production is a game for foreign companies. These conditions have to be adapted 
for us to survive”25. The problem, according to him, is that his company has to 
grow on its proits. Not only does it not have great access to capital, but it pays 
the same taxes and signature bonuses as foreign companies. However, unlike 
foreign companies, it cannot deduct costs in any other jurisdiction oice expens-
es, interest on loans, etc.) from its Angolan taxes. In his interview, the CEO stated 
his belief that Angolan companies must get preferential terms in order to survive 
and that promoting Angolan E&P companies should be a government priority. 
Company ’s staf is almost exclusively “ngolan, with several engineers that 
have experience in multinational companies. According to one senior engineer, 
there are few opportunities for Angolans in upper management, which is why he 
chose to move to Company 1. He complained that the major international oper-
ators are biased against Angolan companies and do not trust them. The senior 
engineer has actually begun registering his own company, which will ofer sup-
ply boats and provide some semi-skilled services such as reservoir engineering 
and production logging in order to take advantage of new policies promoting lo-
cal content26. The conduct of Company 1 and the other entrepreneurial activities 
of its highly qualiied and professional staf show the dynamism and potential 
for “ngolans to contribute meaningfully to the oil sector if given beter oppor-
tunities to do so.
Company 2 enjoys much more direct support from the government and 
Sonangol. It is widely known in the industry that the company was set up by a 
former Minister of Petroleum, although formal ownership on paper rests with 
a variety of Angolans. According to two separate sources I interviewed, owner-
ship may currently include high-ranking oicials in the Ministry. “lthough the 
former minister is not involved in day-to-day operations, at the time the com-
pany won its irst concessions, he was still in charge of the Ministry of Petroleum, 
which would expose several major international oil companies to anti-corruption 
charges in Europe and North America if his role in the company could ever be 
proven publicly.
The full ownership of the company is not publically known, and is said to be 
spread among numerous high-ranking “ngolan oicials. Company ’s contact 
25 Interview, August 2010.
26 Interview, July 2010.
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is more publically available than most companies in Angola. Although it is well 
supported by Sonangol (some informants claimed that it has received special 
concessions from Sonangol, which also acts as concessionaire for Angolan oil 
blocks), it is being managed in a professional way by individuals with the neces-
sary experience and technical backgrounds and seems to be interested in business 
success. The motivation for this interest may largely be to show the industry that 
a private Angolan E&P company can be well-managed and successful. Although 
I was unable to conirm details with senior management despite several requests 
for an interview and visits to their oices, it seemed to me that several of the em-
ployees in their head oice are foreigners. 
The company has also experienced problems raising capital and competing 
as equals with the multinationals, and has therefore advocated preferred treat-
ment for Angolan companies. An Angolan oil insider told me that he saw noth-
ing wrong with the fact that the company was protected and receiving special 
treatment from Sonangol in Sonangol’s role as concessionaire. The real disgrace, 
he argued, is that this is done under the table  and without admiting it. The 
insider argued that there is a mentality in Angola that prevents Sonangol and the 
government from ofering support and favourable conditions to all “ngolan oil 
companies in a transparent fashion27. While Company 2 is another professional 
and reputable Angolan oil company, this case also demonstrates how the promo-
tion of indigenous companies in the oil sector has not been separated from the 
opaque and questionable accumulation strategies of the Angolan elite.
Company  was set up by a group of “ngolans, all former senior oicials in 
Sonangol or the Ministry of Petroleum, although none have been in their pos-
itions recently. It has invested in a small share of a few ofshore blocks but has 
not yet seen a return. The ownership of the company is not public, nor is the com-
pany’s contact information. The director of the company, who is also its largest 
shareholder, told me that he felt pressured by the government and Sonangol to 
invest in these blocks because they want more Angolan E&P companies partici-
pating in the sector. He claims to have had no interest in forming an E&P com-
pany because he knows enough about the industry to know the di culties in 
making them proitable. Instead, he had wanted to concentrate exclusively on oil 
services28. Without state pressure, even this group of knowledgeable and experi-
enced “ngolans would not have chosen to invest in ofshore oil. This example 
demonstrates the complexities of ofshore oil production for “ngolan companies 
(especially without open and equal state assistance). If Angolans with technical 
27 Interview, August 2010.
28 Interview, July 2010.
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and business experience don’t want to invest the upstream sector and wealthy 
but inexperienced rent-seeking members of the Angolan elite are losing money 
on their upstream investments, the focus of local content eforts should be on 
promoting Angolanisation of the workforce and more Angolan content in pro-
curement of goods and services.
Company , is the irst of the ive case studies of oil service companies. In gen-
eral, while obtaining capital is still an issue for oil service companies in Angola 
especially ones ofering highly technical or complex services or services based 
on proprietary technology), the problems faced by Angolan E&P companies do 
not afect oil services to the same extent because E&P – even for onshore extrac-
tion – is signiicantly more capital-intensive. Company  is a group of mostly 
successful Angolan oil service companies controlled by an Angolan businessman 
and former Sonangol oicial. He started each company with diferent “ngolan 
investors, capitalizing on his unique set of experience, training and connections. 
The investors are all well of individual “ngolans. None of the various company 
oices have published contact information. The founder of the companies ob-
serves: “Most of the people have been involved in training, more than anything 
else. Probably it is the biggest business in this country. Producing is something 
diferent 29. In terms of Angolan businesses currently producing goods and ser-
vices of value in the oil services sector, he correctly identiies his company as one 
of a select few.
The individual behind Company 4 has been operating several of his business-
es for many years and has excellent reputation in the industry. With the recent 
local content push, he has found many new opportunities for joint ventures with 
foreign irms – in which he ofers a valuable contribution as an active partner. 
He has been successful in the hostile business climate of Angola because he of-
fers quality specialised services for which there is litle or no domestic competi-
tion. Unfortunately, as he atempts to expand, he is meeting with resistance from 
Sonangol, which even tried to block one of his new joint ventures and force the 
multinational he was working with to choose a diferent “ngolan partner. 
In his companies, the individual behind Company 4 tries to employ mostly 
Angolans. Driving this is a philosophy that: “The oil sector should not be an is-
land that takes everything from outside and puts everything outside”30. Due to 
his contacts with the international oil companies, he meets their staf, and some-
times when he identiies a particularly bright or capable person, he tries to hire 
them away, a practice that illustrates the shortage of skilled engineers in Angola. 
29 Interview, July 2010.
30 Ibid.
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Today, this individual is part of a group of senior experienced Angolans trying 
to form a new company to ofer integrated services to oil operators. In this way, 
he is continuing, along with a core of Angolans with high-level experience in the 
industry, many of whom left Sonangol around the same time at the close of the 
1980s, to push new boundaries and be successful capitalists. 
”y contrast, Company  was the case that exempliied the worst aspects of the 
Angolan business climate. The company is an Angolan enterprise with three core 
businesses: real estate, oil and gas, and investments (including commercial busi-
nesses and agricultural projects). Most prominently, the company is involved 
in the joint venture between Sonangol and a major multinational oil service 
company. Its role in oil and gas, however, is simply to facilitate and invest in 
joint ventures (as a broker) and take a share of the new company. As one of the 
Executive Directors of the company (there is one for each of the three core busi-
nesses) made clear, they do not really even work directly in oil and gas. When I 
pointed out to the Executive Director that all three of its areas of business – real 
estate, investments, and oil and gas – activities in which the company is earning 
rent instead of engaging in production, he laughed and then agreed, without 
responding further31.
It is an open secret that Company 5 is favoured by Sonangol, which is why for-
eign companies looking for an easy entry into Angola seek it out. The company’s 
Executive Director frankly admited that Sonangol often tells multinational com-
panies wanting to enter Angola to contact his company because it is trusted32. 
There are even rumours in Angola that the CEO of Sonangol is behind the com-
pany. While there is litle credible evidence to support this, I did ind that there 
are strong family connections between Sonangol executives and the executives 
involved in Company 533. Acknowledging its good relationship, the Executive 
Director was deliberately vague in explaining how he maintained these good 
ties, at one point laughing when pressed and saying I had asked a very di cult 
question.
Another concern is that the majority of the company’s employees are foreign-
ers (although they should not in theory be able to get so many work permits). 
“ccording to the Executive Director, most of the staf is comprised of Indians, 
Brazilians, Portuguese, and some other Western Europeans. In his words, “We 
don’t have Angolan people with the background to work with us”. The direc-
31 Interview, August 2010.
32 Ibid.
33 The exact family connections were described to me by a trusted source who is a close to one of the directors of 
the company, who is related to the director of one of Sonangol’s largest subsidiaries.
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tor went on to say that he thought most Angolans were lazy and didn’t want to 
work34.
Despite all the criticisms, what is notable about this case is the lengths the 
company takes to appear professional and reputable, as demonstrated by its of-
ice, its very well designed website, and its sleek promotional material. Its oice 
address and contact information are available online, along with a summary of 
its major activities. It seems that this company is a new version of a company 
following an old model of business in Angola. The company takes advantage of 
personal relationships with state oicials to ind business opportunities where it 
does not have to make any meaningful contribution other than to act as a front 
and is therefore not moving towards any kind of value production as opposed to 
rent-seeking.
Company 6 is an Angolan company in a joint venture with a foreign oil ser-
vice company. There are three major shareholders. The international company 
is a minority shareholder, while the Angolan managing director and a former 
Angolan Minister of Commerce hold the remaining equity. The address and con-
tact information of the Angolan company is listed on the website of the inter-
national company. The Angolan company has one contract – a purchasing con-
tract from Chevron worth $2 million per month. An employee of the company 
admited that he thought the company was set up solely to take advantage of the 
opportunity of the one contract – likely identiied by the minister when he was 
still in oice35. 
Another important aspect of this case is the operation of the purchasing con-
tract, which shows several of the limitations of enforced local content. Chevron 
used to source certain supplies and equipment directly from U.S.-based suppli-
ers. Now, the Angolan partner, Company 6, puts in these orders and the ship-
ments go right from the supplier in the U.S. to Chevron. The company then pays 
the bill and is reimbursed from the purchasing contract. As a company employee 
said, “essentially we’re paper pushers”36.
Despite the nature of the company and Chevron’s questionable involvement 
in its creation, Company 6 has plans to build its own warehouses and stock the 
materials Chevron is likely to need, becoming more of an actual supplier and 
making a genuine if not signiicant  economic contribution. It would obviously 
need to employ people to run the warehouse; however these will likely be the 
same people Chevron previously employed (at higher wages) to run its ware-
34 Ibid.
35 Interview, August 2010.
36 Ibid.
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houses. When asked what beneit the company will have for the country, an em-
ployee said The beneit isn’t huge, but you have to start somewhere 37. No one I 
spoke to at Company 6 knew of any plans to build factories in Angola to produce 
any of the materials currently imported from the U.S. Therefore, overall the case 
is one that demonstrates the limits of forcing IOCs and multinationals to achieve 
local content by seting up local companies as opposed to encouraging individ-
uals with real experience and know-how to enter the oil services sector).
Company 7 is founded by an Angolan former Chevron employee. The found-
er, who was sent by Chevron to study business in the U.S., is very keen to build 
a successful company ofering important services to the industry. “lthough the 
company is starting to be well-known in the sector, it does not have publically 
available contact information. Company  began mostly by ofering training 
services in areas like health and safety, ire prevention, etc. It moved into the 
provision of labour, which is still its largest business, and has since moved into 
facility engineering and services, scafolding, metallic construction, electrical 
work, mechanical work, drilling, well bore clean-out, ishing, testing, and parts 
supply and has expanded to all the major port cities in the country. Company 7 
works in partnership with a few large multinational companies. According to the 
operations manager, the company’s goal is to build into more of a conglomerate, 
working in agriculture, manufacturing and other technical/engineering areas38. 
This goal shows that they are taking steps towards the goal of producing and 
creating value.
The operations manager admited that connections and contacts are critic-
al for success in Angola, but argued that “you also need the know-how”. His 
point was that “Once people discover you, you will make lots of money”. The 
most important thing for geting started is to be known by Sonangol and the 
operators”39. The company’s founder and CEO admited that local content is very 
political: “You have a company. You may have talent and abilities, but it you 
don’t have anyone inside of Sonangol or inside the government, you won’t have 
contracts… so you need to create strong links”. Even if an operator may want to 
use a particular company, he said, without the contacts in Sonangol that company 
will likely lose the contract. He complained: “Other companies just go into the 
business and try and do something that is not contributing much to the growth 
of the economy”40. 
37 Ibid.
38 Interview, August 2010.
39 Ibid.
40 Interview, August 2010.
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The company has struggled with the unfair business climate in Angola. Not 
possessing “protection” within Sonangol, the company’s CEO described how he 
had been working on a partnership with a foreign scafolding company until 
someone at Sonangol decided the partnership should not be with Company 7 
and forced the multinational involved to partner with a diferent, newly-created 
company41. Nevertheless the company has vigorously pursued new contracts, 
particularly contracts to work in partnership with multinational oil service com-
panies that hold larger service contracts with the international operators. This 
strategy has allowed it to expand and, to some extent, prosper. This fact demon-
strates that there is some room for a private “ngolan company ofering services 
needed by the IOCs to make money without strong Sonangol connections, though 
it is not clear to me that the company has sworn of the kinds of payments that 
are so common in all areas of the Angolan economy (see Hodges, 2004; Lopes, 
2006).
The inal case similarly demonstrates a positive trend in “ngolan oil services. 
Company  is an “ngolan company, though it works in a few diferent joint ven-
tures. It is a fairly large group, conducting business in Europe and the Americas. 
The company’s aim is to present itself externally as highly professional, similar to 
any Western corporation. It has a well-designed website with a lot of information 
as well as a series of policy documents seting out policies on human resources, 
the company code of conduct, health safety and environmental policies, and an 
Angolanisation policy, along with its contact information. 
Although Company 8’s promotional material is impressive, a mid-level of-
icial in the company admited that the services they provide the oil industry are 
mostly in catering and personal protection equipment, although the plan is to ex-
pand into engineering and upstream activities. He also conirmed that although 
no one on the company’s board currently works for Sonangol or the Ministry of 
Petroleum, most of them used to and entered the sector through those connec-
tions42. 
The company’s most important joint ventures are in catering and protection 
equipment. For the supply of personal protection equipment, Company 8 works 
with a Brazilian company. All the equipment is manufactured in Brazil by this 
partner and imported. However, the Angolan company is building a factory in 
Angola, with the support of the Brazilian company to manufacture the same 
equipment. Company 8 supplies services to a couple of operators, and also to 
41 Ibid.
42 Interview, August 2010. 
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some of the multinational oil service companies as a subcontractor. In this way, 
they are expanding and ofering increasingly valuable services to the industry.
Although these case studies provide evidence for and against a change in 
methods of production and strategies of accumulation, taken together, these 
cases ofer evidence that a shift toward capitalist social relations may be under-
way. As the shift described above continues, it is possible that more and more 
“ngolans will begin to view value production as more proitable than rent-seek-
ing. It is therefore in the context of a structurally diferent conjuncture – more 
than the context of agent-driven decision-making – that this transition is occur-
ring. Although there were intentions among some large and some small compan-
ies to engage in increased manufacturing and value production, there remains a 
great deal of rent-seeking, along with many companies and individuals engaging 
in questionable behaviour. Over time, if this shift is actually occurring, more 
Angolan companies will become more involved in new areas of the oil services 
sector, employing more Angolan labour – both skilled and unskilled.
Conclusion
As with the favoured local groups in any postcolonial context, the Angolan 
elite are privileged. What is diferent, however, is the extent to which the system 
of presidential patronage, built up over Eduardo dos Santos’ more than thirty 
years in power, has unparalleled power to reward the Angolan elites with the 
wealth the country is reaping from its abundant natural resources. The MPLA use 
the power they already have to atack civil society, limit freedom of speech and 
expression, and efectively control the print, radio and television media. They 
are particularly efective at controlling “ngolan society. Where they are unable 
to buy their desired outcome, they have also demonstrated an ability to resort to 
violence and intimidation.
Although these case studies provide evidence for and against a change in 
methods of production and strategies of accumulation, taken together, these 
cases demonstrate a discernible trend towards a shift to capitalist social relations 
in the oil services sector. More Angolans are taking seriously the possibility of 
running successful businesses by ofering quality services to the oil sector. Even 
those hoping to continue accumulating rent from the oil industry are recognising 
the need for international legitimacy. For this reason, many are preparing to ofer 
higher quality value added products and services in order to continue accumu-
lating wealth instead of using their wealth for conspicuous consumption and/or 
moving it abroad. It is precisely this combination of transformations that ofers 
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the possibility (though not by any means the certainty) of producing positive 
change in the everyday lives of large numbers of people.
By way of conclusion, it is necessary to consider what the shift might mean for 
Angola. Far from advocating entrepreneurship and business friendly develop-
ments as beneicial to the country or the majority of its citizens, this paper speaks 
to historical debates about whether capitalism is a good thing for Africa or a 
necessary step and contributes new data and understandings of the current con-
juncture for oil-producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
In the case of Angola, this paper argues that the current transition seems nei-
ther positive nor necessary. The Angolan elite, and in particular the ruling MPLA, 
are adept at using public power for their own beneit. “s Vallée  describes, 
where the government of “ngola has made progress, such as in ighting hyper-
inlation, it has traditionally instituted the minimal conditions, litle by litle, not 
for the development of the country, but for the functioning of a renewed capital-
ism, that is still fundamentally rentier-based” (p. 30, author’s translation). 
Rather than a transition for all Angolans, what is occurring is a transition pri-
marily proiting a small group of “ngolans connected to the MPLA; rather than 
representing the development of industry for all Angolans, it is a transformation 
for a privileged elite – an elite that, as compared to the elite in Europe during its 
own capitalist transformation, is much more centrally organised and hierarchic-
ally structured. 
In response to my research project, economist and opposition politician Justino 
Pinto de Andrade commented that I could call my research an investigation into 
capitalist transformation – but that due to the kind of the capitalists emerging in 
Angola, the result for the country may be more akin to fascism (i.e., capitalism 
without freedom or democracy). The variety of capitalism articulated by Pinto 
de Andrade is a potential outcome in which the wielding of virtually unlimited 
state power by the Angolan elite guarantees a good business climate for individ-
uals connected to the ruling party. Undoubtedly, Angolans can begin to invest in 
value production without creating a beter “ngola. The parameters of “ngola’s 
future are being re-structured by a new historical moment for oil production in 
the Gulf of Guinea. It is therefore in this moment that Angolan agency can shape 
what that future will be.
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